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Lay Jurors in Patent Litigation: Reviving the Active,
Inquisitorial Model for Juror Participation*
Joel C. Johnson**
I. INTRODUCTION
When the peremptory challenges were all exhausted, a jury of
twelve men was impaneled—a jury who swore they had neither heard,
read, talked about nor expressed an opinion concerning a murder
which the very cattle in the corrals, the Indians in the sage-brush and
the stones in the streets were cognizant of! It was a jury composed of
two desperados, two low beer-house politicians, three bar-keepers, two
ranchmen who could not read, and three dull, stupid, human donkeys!
It actually came out afterward, that one of these latter thought that
incest and arson were the same thing.

...

The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a
premium upon ignorance, stupidity and perjury. It is a shame that we
must continue to use a worthless system because it was good a
thousand years ago.1

In recent decades jurors have increasingly been called to
the task of adjudicating patent infringement claims.2 Indeed,
while in 1940 only 2.5% of all patent claims were tried before a
jury, by 1999 that number had swollen to 62%, with most of the
increase occurring in the past 30 years.3 The bourgeoning jury
trial docket coupled with the fact that the technologies at issue
in patent disputes are growing increasingly complex has led
This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu.
J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2002,
Gustavus Adolphus College. For my mother and father, who pushed me to
work my hardest and inspired me to always do my best.
1. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT, 342-43 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1872)
(original emphasis omitted).
2. See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—
an Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 11 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 209 (2002);
Deborah M. Altman, Defining the Role Of The Jury In Patent Litigation: The
Court Takes Inventory, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 699 (1997).
3. Moore, supra note 2, at 210 n.7. Moore remarked that most of the
increase has occurred in the past thirty years. Id. at 210 nn.6-7 (noting that
in 1969 only 2.1% of patent cases were tried to juries, compared with 62% in
1999).
*
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academics and legal practitioners to question the efficacy of
using lay juries to decide patent matters.4 Bolstering the
arguments of those advocating reform, jury verdicts in patent
trials are “often unpredictable and inconsistent.”5 This state of
affairs has led scholars and practitioners alike to call for
reforms.6 Suggestions range from the relatively small step of
allowing jurors in patent cases to take notes and use them
during deliberations7 to disallowing the use of the jury
entirely.8 The ensuing debate over the role of the jury has
pitted due process concerns against that great palladium—the
civil jury. The issue has forced jurists to reconsider the efficacy
of the civil jury trial process. Captured in the midst of this
debate are the federal courts, which have been called upon to
define “the proper role of the jury in [patent] cases.”9
Section II.A of this Note traces the historical development
of the civil jury trial. Section II.B investigates the historical
development of the jury in the patent litigation context
specifically. Section II.C addresses some of the problems facing
the civil jury in patent litigation and the solutions presented
thus far. Part III of this Note provides an analysis of proposed
solutions addressing the use of juries in patent cases. Finally,
this Note concludes that rather than change the composition of
the jury itself, or rid the American system of that hallowed
institution, the process by which the jury obtains, digests, and
recalls information should be modified. That is the manner in
which the patent jury should be reformed. This Note argues
that the central focus of all jury reforms should be to make
jurors better finders-of-fact in patent disputes. Thus, the
4. Id. at 210. See also Michael A. Fisher, The Legality of Expert Juries in
Patent Litigation, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Davin M.
Stockwell, A Jury of One’s (Technically Competent) Peers?, 21 WHITTIER L.
REV. 645 (2000).
5. Altman, supra note 2, at 699.
6. See e.g., Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 614 (1984) (arguing
that in cases of such complexity that they “undoubtedly” fall “well beyond the
framers’ understanding of ‘Suits at common law,’ no party should have a right
to demand a jury trial”); see generally Fisher, supra note 4, at 80-81 (calling for
the use of “Blue Ribbon Juries,” which would consist of “jurors educated in the
relevant science and technology” at issue).
7. Development in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1489,
1509 (1997).
8. See King, supra note 6, at 614; see generally Fisher, supra note 4
(discussing blue ribbon juries).
9. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 645.
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transformations should be aimed at tearing down the
communicative barriers hindering the information-gathering
responsibility of the jury.
II. BACKGROUND
“There was initiated in the twelfth century the most radical
change that has ever occurred in the legal systems of the
Western World.”10
A. THE PALLADIUM OF A FREE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL JURY TRIAL
The Norman Conquest of 106611 is generally credited with
making the common law possible.12 To better understand the
debate surrounding the use of the jury in patent litigation it is
valuable to know something of its genesis. Such knowledge is
exceedingly useful as it provides a framework for
understanding the problems afflicting the jury and those
solutions leveled at it. Additionally, by understanding the
history of the jury and the historical context in which the
institution arose, reformers will be better equipped to battle the
contemporaneous challenges faced by juries and the jury trial.13
The first petit juries14 exhibited only a few characteristics
10. Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the
Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 45 (1980).
11. 1 SIR FREDRICK POLLACK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 79 (2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1898) (Referring
to the Norman invasion of the isle in that year and remarking that it was “a
catastrophe which determin[ed] the whole future history of English law”).
12. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 6
(Butterworths 1971). BAKER noted that the key to the development of the
common law was the centralization of the justice system. Thus, while “[t]he
main developments of the common law have been attributed . . . to Henry II
(1154-1189) . . . the Normans set in motion the forces which within two
centuries gave England a national system of law.” Id.
13. The solutions that can be developed by such a methodology would not
be new, of course, but would result in changes—in some cases drastic—to the
contemporary jury. This historical-contextual approach is beneficial for
several reasons the most important being the reliance of the Supreme Court
on history to develop and shape the role of the modern jury through
constitutional mandates and limitations. See infra note 29 and accompanying
text.
14. The petit jury must be contrasted with the grand, or inquest, jury,
which had an earlier origin. In fact, the Assize of Clarendon institutionalized
the inquest jury as early as 1166. See Assize of Clarendon (1166), reprinted in
HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES16 (Ernest F. Henderson trans.,
ed., George Bell and Sons, 1910). The petit jury followed soon thereafter and
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manifest in contemporary American civil juries.15 In fact, the
first jurators existed only to share in the oath of denial with the
accused.16 As the oath and other forms of trial waned in
popularity, new characteristics emerged that made the jury a
particularly effective adjudicator.17 Jurors of the 13th and 14th
Centuries were selected from pools of individuals who were
thought to know—or were in a position to learn about—the
facts of the case.18 Indeed, jurors were expected to be active
players in the trial process.19 Not only could individual jurors
question witnesses, but they could use information obtained
privately from outside the courtroom in forming their
decision.20 The early jury was extraordinarily active in the
found itself enshrined as a right in 1215 by the hand of King John through the
Magna Carta. But see LORD CROSS OF CHELSEA & G. J. HAND, THE ENGLISH
LEGAL SYSTEM 50 (5th ed., Butterworths 1971) (asserting that the right to a
jury as described in the Magna Carta is significantly different than the right
which exists in the modern era).
15. Compare HENRY CHARLES LEA, THE DUEL AND THE OATH (Edward
Peters, ed., 1974) with Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional
Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 391-414, 421-39 (1996).
16. LEA, supra note 15, at 33-34. Jurators, also known as compurgators,
were not finders of fact. Instead, jurators swore a purgatorial oath. Thus, the
process had nothing to do with truth and instead focused on one’s reputation.
Obtaining jurators was not as simple as it sounds because taking a false oath
was a serious offense. The penalty for doing so ranged from heavy fines to
“the customary penalty [for] perjury” of losing a hand. Id. at 64. See also
Devlin, supra note 10, at 46.
17. See LORD CROSS & HAND, supra note 14, at 90 (noting that the
“mediæval jury . . . was expressly selected from among people who might be
supposed to know or to be in a position to ascertain the facts—from neighbours
of the parties to the action—and they were expected to answer the questions
put to them without the assistance of witnesses”).
18. Id., but cf. Bernard William McLane, Juror Attitudes Toward Local
Disorder: The Evidence of the 1328 Lincolnshire Trailbaston Proceedings, in
TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE 56-58 (J. S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Greene
eds., 1988) (commenting on accepted scholarship that “[i]n theory, trial jurors
were selected from local inhabitants who would be familiar with ‘the facts’ of
the offenses . . . [and] the involvement of the accused”, but observing that
“practice did not necessarily follow theory”).
19. See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary
Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 499
(1990).
20. Id. See also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2
(3d ed. 1999). FRIEDENTHAL notes that:
[J]urors were expected to inform each other on the issues, relying on
their personal knowledge of the events, and to consult any other
reliable sources, including direct communication with the parties.
They were entitled to decide a case on the basis of their knowledge,
even when this contradicted the testimony.
Id. (citing M. HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF
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fact-finding process, at least by contemporary standards of
juror participation.21 But the jury was forced to take a back
seat in the proceedings as the trial became more adversarial in
nature and attorneys asserted and expanded their role.22 Thus
the passive jury model began its ascent to prominence and is
the predominant model today.
While the American colonists did not bring the entirety of
English law across the Atlantic, one legal institution that
colonists did transplant was the jury.23 The colonists kept the
tradition alive before the revolution, and after the War for
Independence, the right to a jury trial in civil matters heard in
federal courts was “preserved” by the Seventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution.24 The States also valued the
civil jury; however, each state had different procedures
ENGLAND 260-61 (1713)).
21. See Smith, supra note 15, at 387.
22. Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the
Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 732 (1993). Landsman notes that the
decline in the use of the active jury began around 1670. Id. at 730. He also
points out that other changes were also occurring at this time, such as the
abolition of the requirement that “jurors be drawn from the exact
neighborhood in which the case arose.” Id. Thus, not only was the jury
becoming more passive, but it was also turning out to be an impartial arbiter
of facts.
While the emerging adversarial process undoubtedly had an impact on the
passivity of the jury, the bench also played a role. Indeed, “the first known
overt restriction” on the jury was the writ of attaint. Hon. Michael B. Dann,
“Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and Democratic
Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1233 (1993). With this writ, “[i]f the judge disagreed
strongly enough with the jury’s returned verdict”, the judge could imprison the
jury and vacate the verdict “on the theory that the jurors perjured themselves
in their capacities as witnesses.” Id.
23. Each of the colonies was, of course, unique and utilized those aspects
of the Common Law that suited its particular needs. See Joseph H. Smith,
The English Criminal Law in Early America, in JOSEPH H. SMITH & THOMAS
G. BARNES, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM: CARRYOVER TO THE COLONIES 22-41
(1975).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Id. According to some commentators, the Seventh Amendment was borne of
an attempt to curtail the “centralizing tendencies of Article III.” Ann
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587,
594 (2001). Indeed, not only did the Seventh Amendment interject a
democratic element, but it also curtailed the Supreme Court’s ability to
“review ‘both as to law and fact’” under its Article III power. Id. at 594-95,
597.
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governing its use.25 The variations seen among the states
should not lead one to question the importance of the jury to
the citizens of early America: the right to a trial by jury was the
only right protected by every state constitution established
between 1776 and 1787 and is guaranteed by the constitutions
of all fifty states today.26 As the nation of colonies rose up to
become an industrial power-house, the authority and role of the
jury in the civil trial waned. During the industrial revolution,
judges came to believe that the jury was simply incapable of
“comprehending the new industrial reality” and was
“irremediably biased against corporate defendants” and so
curtailed the power of the jury accordingly.27 As happened in
England, the once active jury withered. Passivity became the
norm.
B. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY IN PATENT
TRIALS
The Seventh Amendment preserves the individual’s right
to have a jury in those cases in which the common law would

25. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist 83, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 503
(Penguin Books, 1961) (1788). Hamilton argued:
There is a material diversity, as well in the modification as in the
extent of the institution of trial by jury in civil cases, in the several
States; and from this fact these obvious reflections flow: first, that no
general rule could have been fixed upon by the convention which
would have corresponded with the circumstances of all the States;
and secondly, that more or at least as much might have been
hazarded by taking the system of any one State for a standard, as by
omitting a provision altogether and leaving the matter, as it has been
left, to legislative regulation.
Id.
26. See Smith, supra note 15, at 424-25 (1996) (citing Stephan Landsman,
The Civil Jury Trial in America: Scenes From An Unappreciated History, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 579, 607 (1993)); see e.g., NEW YORK STATE COURT SYSTEM,
THE JURY PROJECT, CONTINUING JURY REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 1
(January 2001).
27. Smith, supra note 15, at 450-51. Also noteworthy is the fact that the
ability of the judge to comment on the evidence to the jury was legislatively
curtailed in the states.
See generally Renée Lettow Lerner, The
Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM & MARY
L. REV. 195 (2000). While the move to legislatively curtail the practice of
judicial commentary was borne of a desire to mitigate the judge’s ability to
influence the jury, it may have also had the negative effect of depriving the
jury of a valuable resource. See also WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND
CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE OLD LEGALITY 1889-1932 4
(Bobbs Merrill Co. 1969) (describing the impact of industrialization on the
judiciary and the reaction of ordinary Americans to judicial decisions).
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have allowed it.28 As a result, the courts devised a historical
test to determine whether in current times a particular litigant
has the right to a jury trial.29 The test for determining the
scope of the Seventh Amendment was first enunciated by
Justice Story in United States v. Wonson.30 Since that decision,
eighteenth-century English practice vis-à-vis the use of the jury
in patent litigation has been guiding judicial decisions
regarding the role of the jury in American patent trials.31 The
historical test is relatively simple, but it has profound
implications. Under the test, a court must first ask “whether
[it is] dealing with a cause of action that either was tried at law
at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one that
was.”32 If the cause of action would have been recognized at
our founding, the second query is reached. This inquiry
considers “whether the particular trial decision must fall to the
jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right
as it existed in 1791.”33
1. At Common Law in England
Throughout England in the eighteenth-century, the jury
played an important role in adjudicating patent disputes.
Since patent infringement actions could be brought both “at
law and . . . in equity”, patentees could opt for a jury trial by
seeking damages and then requesting a jury.34 Alternatively, a
patentee could forgo a jury trial entirely by bringing an

28. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
29. See United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C. Mass. 1812)
(No. 16,750).
30. In essence, Justice Story argued that the right to a jury trial exists
depends on whether the right existed at English common law. Cf. id. (noting
that “the common law [preserved by the Seventh Amendment] . . . is not the
common law of any individual state . . . but is the common law of England”).
31. See Altman, supra note 2, at 704.
32. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
33. Id. Determining whether a matter would have been tried at law or
equity is not as simple as it sounds. Indeed, “the most erudite and lucid of
English legal historians” could only say of equity that it “is that body of rules
which is administered only by those Courts which are known as Courts of
Equity.” Devlin, supra note 10, at 45 (quoting F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 1 (2d ed.
1936)).
34. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see Brian D. Coggio
& Timothy E. Demasi, The Right to A Jury Trial in Actions for Patent
Infringement and Suits for Declaratory Judgment, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 205, 206 (2002).
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equitable action.35 Thus, historically, it was the patentee’s
choice of remedy that determined whether the action was at
law or equity.36 Whether the action was legal or equitable had
a direct impact on whether the case could or could not be tried
by jury.37 In the English equivalent to an action seeking
declaration of patent invalidity,38 a patentee was guaranteed
that a jury would decide his fate.39
2. The American Treatment of the Jury in Patent Trials
In America, the use of the jury in patent cases followed a
path very similar to that in England.40 To wit, “courts broadly
construed each of its functions to assure that the right to a trial
by jury would be preserved.”41 Indeed, juries have participated
in patent disputes since 1790 when the first patent statute was
enacted.42 While it was almost always the province of the
35. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976; see Coggio & Demasi, supra note 34,
at 205.
36. Coggio & Demasi, supra note 34, at 207.
37. Id. at 206-07.
38. The writ of scire facias was an action brought by the King to show why
a patent “should not be repealed or revoked.” In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 974
n.9 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S.
315, 360 (1888)).
39. Indeed, even though the writ of scire facias was brought in the
juryless Court of Chancery (a court of equity), in such cases “the proceeding in
chancery was suspended pending a determination by a jury summoned in the
Court of King’s Bench”, where juries were available. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d
at 975 n.9.
40. Id. at 976, citing Marsh v. Seymore, 97 U.S. 348, 349 (1877) and Wise
v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co., 33 F. 277, 278 (W.D. Mo. 1888). Both Marsh and Wise
held that a patentee could seek redress in either a court of law or equity;
Coggio & Demasi, supra note 34, at 207.
41. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 665 (emphasis added), citing Root v. Ry.
Co., 105 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1881) (noting that where previous acts had
conferred “jurisdiction in patent cases in equity as well as at law”, the Court
held that such a “distinction of jurisdiction” “is constitutional, to the extent to
which the seventh amendment forbids any infringement of the right of trial by
jury, as fixed by the common law”). See also Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330,
344 (1853) (a patent infringement case holding that the question of whether
“the defendant’s [train] cars did copy the plaintiff’s invention . . . is a question
for the jury”); Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S. 218, 226 (1852) (describing
circumstances constituting “question[s] of fact which . . . should be left to the
jury”).
42. Moore, supra note 2, at 210. See also An Act to promote the progress
of useful Arts, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (1790) (the act entitles a patentee to
“such damages as shall be assessed by a jury” upon a finding of infringement).
An interesting note regarding this law is that it was enacted before the
ratification of the Bill of Rights and, thus, the Seventh Amendment. While
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judiciary to resolve matters of law “the Supreme Court, in some
instances, permitted . . . decisions [where legal and factual
issues were intertwined] to be addressed and decided by the
jury.”43 Through custom and by decision, the jury came to play
an essential role in the patent trial. From the beginning, juries
were given complex tasks such as deciding whether the
“specifications, including the claim, were so precise as to enable
any person skilled in the structure of machines, to make the
one described.”44 Jurors also decided on the “novelty of the
invention, and [in the case of renewed patents,] whether the
renewed patent is for the same invention as the original
patent.”45
In the specific context of an infringement claim then, the
jury must first determine whether a given patent is valid.46
Only then may it resolve the infringement question.47 While
the jury played a vital role in individual cases historically, on
the whole, juror participation in patent trials was infrequent.48
In fact, bench trials “became the norm” as early as 1870 when
the equity courts were granted the “power to award common
law damages.”49 From that point until the late twentieth
century, juries were an unusual object in patent litigations.
While from 1968 until 1970, “juries decided only thirteen of
nearly four hundred patent trials”,50 by 1999 juries tried an

that fact by itself may be of little use, note that the Congress that enacted the
1790 patent act was the same that drafted the Seventh Amendment. This
strongly supports arguments contending that juries should be guaranteed for
patent actions at law. At the very least, it is evidence that Congress
anticipated juries would play some role in patent litigation.
43. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 665.
44. Battin v. Taggert, 58 U.S. 74, 85 (1854).
45. Id. The Court went on to say that “[t]here are other questions of fact
which come within the province of a jury; such as the identity of the machine
used by the defendant with that of the plaintiff’s, or whether they have been
constructed and act on the same principle.” Id.
46. See Stockwell, supra note 4, at 667.
47. Id. at 667-68. The jury must first consider whether the patent
application “demonstrated the necessary novelty and utility in light of any
previous similar inventions. If the patent holder established utility, then the
jury had to find that the patent was also not obvious in light of the prior art.”
Id. at 667. Damages would then be assessed for a finding of infringement
upon a valid patent. Id. at 668.
48. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 660.
49. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, C. J.,
dissenting).
50. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 660.

JOHNSON

348

05/12/2004 12:58 PM

MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW

[Vol. 5:2

astounding 62% of all patent trials.51
3. The Jury in Contemporary American Patent Litigation
In 1979 the Ninth Circuit held that there is no
“complexity” exception to the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial in civil cases.52 The import of such a holding is selfevident. The right to a jury trial in cases where one would have
been allowed at common law cannot be abrogated simply
because a judge determines that the case at hand is too
complex for a jury to decide. Without passing judgment on the
use of the jury in complex modern patent litigations, one thing
is certain—the role the jury plays in individual cases is
significant. The number of patent trials for which jurors are
summoned when coupled with the serious consequences
inherent in any legal decision only serves to underscore the
importance of the issue. This reality also demands that the
legal community look closely at the process by which patent
disputes are resolved.
Reacting to this new reality in three recent cases, In re
Lockwood,53 Hilton Davis Chemical v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,54
and Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,55 the Federal
Circuit and Supreme Court have undertaken a transformation
of the role that juries play in patent trials.56
51. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
52. In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979) . The
court not only “refuse[d] to read a complexity exception into the Seventh
Amendment”, but it also “express[ed] grave reservations about whether a
meaningful test could be developed were we to find such an exception.” Id.
The court rejected the attempt to “demean[] the intelligence of the citizens of
this Nation.” Id. at 430. It noted that “[j]urors, if properly instructed and
treated with deserved respect, bring collective intelligence, wisdom, and
dedication to their tasks, which is rarely equalled [sic] in other areas of public
service.” Id. But see In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d
1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980), (holding that the Seventh Amendment does not
guarantee the right to jury trial when “a jury will not be able to perform its
task of rational decision[-]making with a reasonable understanding of the
evidence and the relevant legal standards” and concluding that “[i]n lawsuits
of this complexity, the interests protected by this procedural rule of due
process carry greater weight than the interests served by the constitutional
guarantee of jury trial”).
53. 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
54. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
55. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
56. Mark B. Watson, Expansion, Compression and Relief: An Analysis of
the Jury’s Role in Patent Infringement Cases Employing the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 91, 99-100 (1996). Watson points
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a. In re Lockwood
In the first of the trilogy, In re Lockwood, patentee
Lockwood (“Patentee”) brought an infringement action against
an airline.57 While both equitable and non-equitable relief was
sought, only equitable claims remained after American’s
motion for summary judgment was granted on the
infringement issue.58 An important question was thus raised—
could the patentee still receive a jury trial even though the only
remaining claim was equitable in nature? On rehearing, the
Federal Circuit held that since the core controversy in the case
was a patent infringement action “in which the affirmative
defense of invalidity has been pled”, the patentee’s “right to a
jury trial must be determined accordingly.”59 Thus, even
though the remaining action was equitable in nature, the court
out that in Markman, the court restricted the role of the jury by holding that
“claim interpretation is a question of law for the court to decide,” while the
Hilton Davis court expanded the jury’s role by ruling that the “determination
of equivalence” is a fact-question and is thus within the province of the jury.
Watson, supra, at 99 nn.62-63. In equivalence patent infringement cases, the
Federal Circuit has shown a willingness to disregard jury verdicts. Id. at 102.
Watson reports that in at least three cases, the Federal Circuit has affirmed
district court decisions overruling jury verdicts. Id. at 100-02. In Newell Co.
v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the jury came back with its
verdict that the plaintiff’s patent “was not obvious, but that the defendant did
in fact, infringe on it.” Watson, supra, at 101. The district court overturned
the jury verdict and “the Federal Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district
court stating that there was ‘no legal error’ in holding that the patent was
obvious.” Id.
In the case of Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., the jury found that the
plaintiff’s patent had been infringed and awarded him $950,000 in damages.
952 F.2d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Claiming that there was “insufficient to
support a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents”, the
district court overturned the verdict. Id. at 1327. The Federal Circuit
affirmed. Id. at 1328.
Finally, in the famous Markman case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff patentee, but the district court promptly “granted the defendant’s
motion for a [Judgment as a Matter of Law].” Watson, supra, at 103. Again,
the Federal Circuit affirmed. Id. at 104. On review, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Federal Circuit. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
57. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Specifically,
Patentee alleged that American Airlines had infringed his patents relating to
“self-service terminals and automatic ticket dispensing systems.” Id.
58. See id. at 968-69; Altman, supra note 2, at 708-09.
59. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 974. The court noted, “the primary
difference between American’s action and the infringement suit that would
formerly have been required for an adjudication of validity is that the parties’
positions here have been inverted.” Id. at 974-75.
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concluded that it was more important that the patentee control
whether a particular action would be eligible for a jury trial.
b. Hilton Davis
Hilton Davis represents the Federal Circuit’s affirmation of
the sanctity of the jury verdict in patent cases. In that case the
court in an en banc rehearing asked the parties to address
whether “the issue of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents60 [was] an equitable remedy to be decided by the
court, or . . . like literal infringement, . . . [was] an issue of fact
to be submitted to the jury.”61 The court held that the issue of
infringement was undoubtedly a question of fact.62 In so
holding the Federal Circuit is in good company. In Graver
Tank the Supreme Court held that a finding of equivalence was
“a determination of fact.”63 Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded
“infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of
fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury trial.”64 The decision
“shocked” a legal community still reeling from the Markman
In practice, however, Hilton Davis did not
decision.65
reinvigorate the role of the jury in patent trials as much as
Markman destroyed it—the court retained the power of claim
determination.66 It is the Markman case to which this Note
now turns.

60. The doctrine of equivalents refers to an action brought by a patentee
in which there is not a literal infringement of the patent, but where the
“infringing” device performs “substantially the same function in substantially
the same way to obtain the same result.” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950); Watson, supra note 56, at 91 (explaining
the difference between literal infringement and infringement based on the
equivalence doctrine).
61. Hilton Davis Chem. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
62. See id. at 1520 (noting that this issue had been firmly resolved by the
Supreme Court). See Graver Tank, 399 U.S. at 609-10.
63. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
64. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522.
65. Watson, supra note 56, at 109-10, 111-12. Indeed, Watson points out
that the court itself was not in total agreement over the outcome, as it drew
three dissenting opinions. Id. at 110-11. Watson also notes, “[p]rior to the
Hilton decision, many felt that the doctrine of equivalents was an equitable
remedy, and thus not on the same level as statutory literal infringement.” Id.
at 114.
66. Watson, supra note 56, at 112.
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c. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
In Markman the Supreme Court addressed whether claim
interpretation lay within the province of the judge or the jury.67
At trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of Markman on the
infringement claim, but the court granted Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict against Markman because it
disagreed with the jury over its interpretation of the claim.68
Both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the
action by the lower court.69 The Court reasoned that the
“history and precedent” on the topic suffered from a lack of
perspicuity on the issue of whether the judge or jury should
“define terms of art.”70 The inquiry is basically this: Which of
the two parties “is better positioned . . . to decide the issue in
question”?71 Since the “construction of written documents” has
often been found to be within the province of the judge, the
court thought it wise to hold that claim construction was
exclusively for the judge to perform.72
d. The Jury’s Role
In patent trials, as in any jury trial, the role of the jury is
to resolve questions of fact.73 Indeed, the role of the jury has
been confined exclusively to fact-finding since the Supreme
Court resolved the issue in Sparf v. United States in 1895.74 As
67. Markman, 517 U.S. at 375.
68. Id. at 375-76. The disagreement stems from divergent interpretations
of the word “inventory.” Id. at 375. The jury apparently interpreted that word
to mean only cash inventory (which results in an infringement of Markman’s
patent). Id. The court, on the other hand, interpreted inventory to mean
physical inventory only, which means that there can be no infringement of the
patent unless the infringing system can track both types. Id.; Altman, supra
note 2, at 713.
69. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970, 988-89
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
70. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part 1),
83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 797 (2001). Signore noted that
while the fact-law distinction usually holds true, there are exceptions to the
rule. Id. For example, the issue of whether a patentee committed inequitable
conduct before the United States Patent and Trademark Office is “sometimes
reserved for the judge because of the equitable nature of the overall issue.” Id.
74. 156 U.S. 51, 101-03 (1895) (holding in the context of the criminal trial,
that when the jury ceases to be bound to apply the law as the judge has stated
it, society would become imperiled as “our government . . . cease[s] to be a
government of laws, and become[s] a government of men. Liberty regulated by
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important as that distinction is, the general notion that the
jury is a “fact-finder” is unhelpful given the myriad decisions
that have shaped the role of the jury and its interplay with the
judge. Therefore, this section will address the various parts of
a patent trial. There are at least five main parts in any patent
trial.75 First, the claim must be interpreted.76 As the prior
section demonstrated, that job has been delegated to the
judge.77 The second issue to be addressed is the validity of the
patent involved.78
The issue of validity too, has been
determined to be a question of law.79 However, since the issue
of validity is usually wrapped up in fact questions, “courts often
let the jury decide the validity issue.”80 The third matter is
whether infringement has occurred.81 It is well settled that the
determination of patent infringement requires a factual inquiry
and is therefore most appropriately placed into the jurors’
hands.82 The fourth question that must be answered is
whether the patent is unenforceable due to fraudulent or

law is the underlying principal of our institutions”).
75. See Signore, supra note 73, at 799-810.
76. Id. at 799.
77. See supra Part II.B.3.c and accompanying notes. Moreover, in
addition to being the first part of a patent trial, claim interpretation is also
probably “the most important issue in a patent litigation because it affects the
findings on the validity, infringement, and enforceability of the patent.”
Signore, supra note 73, at 799.
78. Signore, supra note 73, at 800.
79. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S.
147, 155 (1950); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1966).
80. Signore, supra note 73, at 800. Signore also notes that while the jury
usually decides whether a patent is valid or not, since the issue is one of law
and not fact, the decision remains “reviewable on appeal de novo.” Id. Among
the numerous mixed fact-law questions that the jury must decide are the
utility of the infringed patent, whether “a person of ordinary skill in the art in
the field of the invention” could “make and use the claimed invention” based
on the patent (enablement), and whether the patent contains a valid, “written
description of the claimed invention.” Id. at 801-02. Additionally, the jury
must determine whether the patent describes the “best mode of carrying out
the claimed invention”, whether the claimed invention is novel, whether the
patentee has lost his right to a patent because of prior sale or use, and finally,
the issue of obviousness, though a legal conclusion, has been left for the jury
since it factual issues envelop the inquiry. Id. at 802-05.
81. See Signore, supra note 73, at 805.
82. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609
(1950) (“A finding of equivalence is a determination of fact.”); see also, SRI Int’l
v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1125 (1985) (“It is settled
that the question of infringement (literal or by equivalents) is factual.”).
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inequitable conduct by the patentee.83 Finally, while the court
has the power to determine what the character of the damages
will be (e.g., actual damages and a reasonable royalty), it is the
jury that decides the “amount of a prevailing party’s
damages.”84 As can be seen, though it has been limited, the
jury continues to have a significant role in patent litigations.
But the significant task jurors have been called upon to
perform coupled with the hyper-technicality of modern patent
trials has led many to question whether the lay jury is up to the
challenge.
C. TAKING ISSUE: QUESTIONING THE COMPETENCY OF LAY
JURORS

Lay jurors play an important role in patent litigation, but
their function and utility have come under fire in recent
years.85 Indeed one commentator has stated that “[t]he worst
problem with the patent system in my opinion is juries in the
patent system.”86 At the same time, others argue that the
problem is not as severe as so many perceive it to be.87
Nevertheless, as technologies that are the object of patents
become more complex, most commentators argue jurors are less
likely to comprehend the task before them.88 The response
from academia and the legal field has been heated, and the
solutions proposed are diverse. For the most part, however,
there are two categories of reform proposals: those dealing with
the role and characteristics of the jury and those dealing with

83. See Signore, supra at note 73, at 808.
84. Smithkline Diagnostics v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164
(1991) (emphasis added).
85. See Altman, supra note 2, at 699.
86. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 660.
87. See Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part
II), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 896 (2001) (noting that in reality only
a “few patent cases are tried by juries”). Since the role of the jury in those
cases can be limited, Signore argues that the impact of uncomprehending
jurors on the overall system is “relatively small.” Id. at 897.
88. See Stockwell, supra note 4, at 645 (noting that today’s technology is a
world apart from the technologies driving the industrial revolution); Fisher,
supra note 4, at 1 (noting how as the complexity of patented technologies
increases, the ability of jurors to understand the issues may suffer); but see
John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in
Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 766, 770 (2000)
(noting that the presence of a jury has had a positive impact as well. For
example, “[t]he presence of the jury forces simplification and acceleration of
trials once they begin, and is likely to reduce interruptions”).
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the role and characteristics of the judge.89 This section will
look at those proposed solutions.
1. Reforming Patent Litigation: The Special Jury
While several different solutions have been put forth, the
one that appears to be most popular is the utilization of an old
common law practice—the special jury.90 Stockwell argues that
because the right to a trial by jury necessarily implies that the
jury be properly equipped for its job, Congress should mandate
that those in the jury pool have training similar to that of
“patent practitioners” required by the Patent and Trademark
Office.91 Such a jury, it is thought, would be in a position to
understand the issues presented at trial because of its
members’ specialized education.92 There are variants of this
proposal as well. For example, at least one scheme would
create a mixed jury composed of lay jurors as well as “special”
jurors.93 This diversification would be accomplished either by
creating a jury pool consisting of at least forty percent special
jurors or by having two pools of jurors, from which a certain
number would be selected.94
2. Reforming Patent Litigation: Specialized Courts
The second school of thought proposes that the judiciary
itself become more specialized so that it can be more adept at
adjudicating cases involving modern technological realities.95
89. See e.g., Fisher, supra note 4; Signore, supra note 87. See also LeRoy
L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through
Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J. L. & Tech. 1,
11 (2002), at http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/01_020309_kondo.php
90. Fisher, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that the practice of having
merchant jurors hear trade disputes goes back to the fourteenth century, and
the practice of utilizing special juries also has a history in the United States).
For a detailed account of the use of the special jury, see James C. Oldham, The
Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (1983).
91. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 685-86.
92. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that using such expert jurors in
patent infringement cases would be “particularly beneficial” and “is arguably
the only realistic way to achieve a just result”); Stockwell, supra note 4, at 661
(noting that “[a] panel of technically trained individuals would be in a better
position, than a judge trained in law, to understand and resolve the issues
associated with the patent infringement. Furthermore, such a panel would
certainly be a marked improvement over the current traditional jury system”).
93. Signore, supra note 87, at 900.
94. Id.
95. Kondo, supra note 89, at 11.
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As a model for this specialization, Professor Kondo argues that
reformers should look to the states, as they have successfully
created “business courts, adult drug courts, family courts,
juvenile drug courts, teen courts, [and] domestic violence
courts.”96 More important than the number of courts that
numerous states have created is the fact that the specialization
has had the effect of making decisions more consistent and
giving the specialist judges more credibility.97 If the federal
court system would create specialty trial courts to deal with
patent litigation, it would allow the courts to have a “greater
uniformity of judgment.”98 In addition, specialization could
occur with relatively minor changes.99 For example, while it
would be ideal to have specially trained judges on the bench,
specialization could occur simply by utilizing experts, special
masters, and technical advisors who would assist the
judiciary.100
3. Reducing Juror Passivity: An Inquisitorial Approach
The method advocated by this Note, and the third
approach to reform, is to reduce juror passivity in the
courtroom. This Note argues that reducing juror passivity has
the most potential to cure a defective jury trial process in
patent litigation.101 Juror passivity would be reduced in three
ways. First, jurors would be allowed to take notes during
Importantly, those notes could be used during
trial.102
deliberations.103 Second, jurors would be allowed to question
witnesses.104 As will be discussed infra part III.C.2, this is one
of the more controversial reform proposals; however,
restrictions could be put into place that would alleviate many of
the concerns brought about by such a procedure.105 Finally,
jurors should be allowed to discuss the case among themselves

96. Id. at 14.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id. at 24.
100. Id. at 24, 28.
101. See generally infra Part III.C.
102. See Tom M. Dees III, Juries: On the Verge of Extinction? A Discussion
of Jury Reform, 54 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1773 (2001).
103. See id.
104. See Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the
Adversarial Ideal, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 85, 90-91 (2002).
105. See Dann, supra note 22, at 1254-55.
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during the course of the trial.106 These reforms, while not
perfect, would go a long way towards improving jurors’ abilities
to comprehend complex cases and to decide them correctly.
III. ANALYSIS
I am by no means enamored of jury trials, at least in civil cases, but it
is certainly inconsistent to trust them so reverently as we do, and still
to surround them with restrictions which if they have any rational
validity whatever, depend upon distrust.107

The proposals as set forth are not flawless. While each has
the potential to increase the predictability and improve the
accuracy of the jury trial, the faults that exist must be
considered.
This section will address the strengths and
shortcomings of the two approaches to reform the current
patent litigation process rejected by this Note.
A. THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL: SETTING THE BAR HIGHER
In response to the perceived problem of juror
incompetence, commentators have proposed the use of special,
or expert, juries in patent disputes.108 Special juries would
have several advantages over the current lay jury model.109
Among the advantages noted by Fisher, the most notable is the
increased likelihood that jurors will be able to comprehend the
issues in the case.110 In addition, given the standard for
determining patent validity, it is likely that jurors familiar
with the technological arts at issue in the litigation would be
better equipped to make a rational decision.111 Not only would
a special jury be a useful tool in patent litigation, there is also
historical support for its use in other contexts.112 Most
commonly the special jury was used in disputes between

106. See id. at 1262.
107. Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the
Matter, in LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS: 1921-1922, at 89, 101 (James N.
Rosenberg et al. eds., 1926).
108. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
109. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 80; Stockwell, supra note 4, at 682.
Moreover, it is likely that this increased level of juror comprehension would
lead to more predictable and more stable decisions, thus eliminating one of the
largest perceived problems. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
110. Fisher, supra note 4, at 90.
111. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
112. See Oldham, supra note 90, at 139 and accompanying text. Among
the special juries that have been used, historically, is the trial de medietate
linguae, which consisted of a jury of half foreigners.
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merchants.113
In those cases the jury was composed of
merchants who would decide the case.114
It is clear that a special jury composed of engineers or
other “experts” would have the tendency to improve the
accuracy of the fact-finding ability of the jury. Moreover, it is
likely that, given the historical support for special juries, such a
practice would probably survive a constitutional attack.115
Even though there exists historical support for the use of
special juries in certain cases, that alone is not reason enough
to revive the tradition.116 Several problems exist that call the
feasibility of such a system into question. Moreover, other
reforms exist that might mitigate the necessity of such a
drastic step.117
113. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that the practice of using a jury
in mercantile disputes “goes back at least to the fourteenth century”).
114. Id.
115. But see Fisher, supra note 4, at 19-23 (describing the possibility that a
special jury might violate the Equal Protection Clause since the practice might
not comport with the “fair cross section” requirement that jury selection
requires).
116. Indeed, while the historical context is very important—as this Note
strenuously maintains—it is but one factor in the analysis. While study of the
historical antecedents of various institutions allows for a more informed
approach to reforming the current versions of those institutions, it also must
be remembered that many institutions have passed on into the dustbin of
history for a reason. For example, until relatively recently, citizens of some
states could not serve on a jury unless they met certain property
requirements. While the belief was that such qualifications resulted in a jury
composed of individuals less prone to bribery, few would argue that such a
system should be revived. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief
History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867
(1994).
117. See discussion infra Section III.C. Indeed, it is the position of this
Note that such a step is not as urgent as others suggest. Fisher argues that
the use of a lay jury in certain patent cases may be unconstitutional—a
violation of due process.
See Fisher, supra note 4, at 13-16.
This
characterization of the jury is unreasonable and most unfortunate. As Fisher
points out, the Third Circuit did hold that “[d]ue process requires that jurors
be sane and competent during trial.” Id. at 5. It has also been held that “due
process is violated by a jury incapable of rendering a rational verdict.” Id. at
13. Fisher then takes the leap to argue that “if a non-expert jury is utterly
incapable of comprehending the technology in a patent case, can its decisionmaking be any more rational than that of an insane jury? The answer must
surely be no.” Id. at 47.
With regard to the analogy between a potentially insane juror experiencing
delusions and paranoid schizophrenia, see Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465, 466
(2d Cir. 1980), and a lay jury deciding a complex case, the error should be
readily apparent. In the former case, the fear is that the particular juror had
lost all ability to reason; in the latter instance, jurors retain all of their
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While using a special jury may have the desired effect of
improving the accuracy of the fact-finding process, the practice
of convening expert juries in complex patent cases raises
significant problems. Even if one believes that, in principle,
special juries are a good thing, one still must face the realities
of the jury selection process. Implementation of a special jury
in real cases and on the scale envisioned would create an
administrative mess. For example, Fisher proposes that the
courts develop separate jury wheels, “one for ordinary jurors,
and one for each type of technology likely to arise in patent
litigation.”118 Moreover, in cases involving multiple specialties,
Fisher proposes that the court “require each juror to have a
background in at least one discipline related to the patents in
dispute.”119 The problem with such a solution is that it is
simply unworkable. Not only would it be difficult to target all
of those with special expertise, label them, place them into
categories, and then wait until a lawsuit springs up, but it
would also be difficult to keep such individuals on a jury. It
must not be forgotten that ultimately, it is the attorneys who
play the most significant role in jury selection. Considering the
current practice of weeding out more intelligent jurors, it is
difficult to see how this kind of scheme would work.

faculties; however, they lack a technical education. This Note is in agreement
with the Ninth Circuit in that the onus for ensuring juror comprehension
should fall onto the backs of the attorneys. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609
F.2d 411, 427 (9th Cir. 1979). The court further noted that “[w]hether a case
is tried to a jury or to a judge, the task of the attorney remains the same. The
attorney must organize and assemble a complex mass of information into a
form which is understandable to the uninitiated.” Id.
Courts in other circuits have also followed the Ninth Circuit lead. Indeed, a
district court in the Sixth Circuit criticized the rationale of the Third Circuit.
In Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., the court noted:
Those who claim that juries cannot understand complex civil cases
improperly demean the intelligence of the citizens of this nation, and
do not understand the jury system . . . .
Those who would seek an “elitest” [sic] approach to the use of the jury
trial would undermine one of the most fundamental of our rights.
There is no complexity exception to a jury trial that would authorize
the denial of a jury when it is otherwise available under the Seventh
Amendment.
Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
118. Fisher, supra note 4, at 67.
119. Id. at 71.
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B. SPECIALIZATION OF THE COURTS
The second major type of reform that has been proposed is
potentially the most drastic depending on how it is
implemented. If the judiciary is specialized and the civil jury is
eliminated in such courtrooms, unique constitutional
challenges will follow. If, on the other hand, the judiciary is
specialized without curtailing the Seventh Amendment right to
a civil trial by jury, the constitutional questions vanish.
Specialization of the district courts would have several
advantages over the current scheme. Indeed, the advantages of
specialized courts have led to widespread acceptance of them
abroad.120 For example, in England patent trials take place in
the Patents Court, a division of the Chancery Division.121 In
1990 Parliament created the Patents County Court—”a small
claimants’ court, suitable for disputes between small and
medium-sized entities.”122 Japan has also begun to create
specialized courts for patent infringement cases.123 Even the
United States has experimented with specialization by way of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which was created in 1982.124 That court was given “exclusive
jurisdiction over [Patent and Trademark Office] appeals for
both patent denials and interference proceedings.”125 Thus far,
the Federal Circuit has been effective at not only delineating
“patent law doctrine”, but it has become the “de facto ‘court of
last resort’ for patent cases.”126 Consonant with its purpose, in
the relatively short period of time since its inception, the
Federal Circuit has “already provided some degree of
uniformity and predictability to the area of intellectual
property law.”127
While specialization of the judiciary poses no constitutional
problems in and of itself,128 problems arise when the

120. See Pegram, supra note 88, at 773-80.
121. Id. at 774.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 776-77.
124. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No 97-164, 96
Stat. 25 (1982), codified as 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000).
125. Kondo, supra note 89, at 15 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 20.
127. Id. at 20.
128. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”) (emphasis added).
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specialization includes eliminating the use of the civil jury in
violation of the Seventh Amendment.129 To pass constitutional
muster, any reform proposal would have to allow litigants the
opportunity to have cases heard by a jury if that would have
been allowed at common law.130 Thus, the challenges created
by the use of a lay jury remain.
C. REFORMING THE JURY: REDUCING JUROR PASSIVITY AS A
WAY OF IMPROVING JUROR ACCURACY
As has been stated, those seeking to transform jury trials
in the patent litigation context generally fall into one of two
potentially overlapping camps. The first camp consists of those
who argue that the characteristics of the jury are to blame for
the ills observed.131 They claim that the jurors comprising the
jury are uneducated and unable to comprehend the subject
matter of the patent disputes before them. The second camp
has challenged Congress to create specialty courts where
judges would have similar qualifications to those currently
practicing patent law.132 Within this proposal there are two
possibilities—the specialty court could either sit with a jury
when one is requested or it could sit by itself. As argued
earlier, the latter is an unacceptable abridgment of the Seventh
Amendment.133 One commonality that exists between both
camps is that they both seek to improve the accuracy and
efficacy of the patent litigation process by use of individuals
specifically trained in the technical sciences.
Of those
advocating reform of the patent litigation process specifically
(as opposed to complex litigation generally), few have taken the
approach advocated by this Note.
So long as the jury remains in use in patent litigations,
problems will remain with regard to juror comprehension of
complex facts and the law not because of the intelligence or
educational stature of jurors, but because of the procedures

129. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; cf. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745,
750 (C.C. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (holding that the facts tried by a jury are
never re-examined, unless a new trial is granted by the trial court or the
judgment of the trial court is reversed by a writ of error).
130. U.S. CONST. amend VII; see Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 750; see also supra
section II.B.
131. See infra section II.C.1.
132. See infra section II.C.2.
133. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
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surrounding the jury trial.134 Even if the reforms described
supra at section II.C.1 and section II.C.2 were carried out,
problems would remain because of the restrictive procedures
that envelop the jury trial. This Note contends that the
procedural barriers have been put into place because of one
assumption, which is that a neutral decision maker must be a
passive one.135 Jurors today are relegated to the role of
observer. They “are not permitted to ask questions and in some
jurisdictions are not even allowed to take notes. They are
instructed to refrain from speaking with one another and with
outsiders for the duration of the trial. They are instructed to
hold off reaching a conclusion until the final deliberations.”136
This Note advocates a tempered return to the inquisitorial,
active jury model as a way of improving the ability of the jury
to perform its fact-finding role and increasing its level of
comprehension and understanding of the issues in patent
cases.137 While numerous lawyers and judges will reject such
proposals out of a “fear of losing total control over the trial and
fact-finding processes”, such measures are essential to the
viability of the jury trial process.138
1. Juror Note-Taking
One of the easiest ways of boosting juror comprehension
and understanding of the evidence in patent cases would be to
allow jurors to take notes during the trial and to use those
notes during deliberations.139 While the reform is not without
detractors,140 by and large, there is a growing consensus that
134. See Arizona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of
Juries, Jurors: The Power of 12 1 at ¶ 2 (November 1994) [hereinafter Jurors:
The Power of 12]; see generally Dees, supra note 102 (discussing the Arizona
jury reform proposals).
135. See Hans, supra note 104, at 87 (noting that adversarial system is
premised on the assumption that a neutral arbitrator must be passive).
136. Id. at 89-90.
137. See discussion supra at section II.A (describing the active nature of
the early petit jury).
138. Dann, supra note 22, at 1236-37.
139. See Jurors: Power of 12, supra note 134, at 83; but cf. Dees, supra note
102, at 1773 (discussing criticism of the proposal to allow jurors to take notes
during trial).
140. Dees provides a list of ten criticisms of juror note taking:
[(1)] jurors who take notes may participate more effectively in jury
deliberations than those who do not; [(2)] jurors may miss important
testimony because they are busy writing down every detail; [(3)]
jurors may be less attentive to witnesses’ behavior and demeanor,
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such a reform would have significant benefits.141 Both the
Arizona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of
Juries and the Supreme Court of Texas Jury Task Force have
found that the benefits outweigh any disadvantages that may
exist.142 While allowing jurors to take notes during trial is a
small and, arguably, non-controversial reform, it would go a
long way towards rectifying the problem of reduced juror
retention of information and material presented.143 Allowing
juror note-taking is an important step, but in isolation, it can
do little to improve the ability of jurors to understand the
material presented at trial.

which are important characteristics to note when assessing credibility
of witnesses; [(4)] jurors may take notes of inadmissible or stricken
material and accentuate irrelevant things while ignoring more
substantial issues; [(5)] jurors may attach significance to their notes
simply because they are in writing; [(6)] researches have found a
correlation between the best note takers and those who dominate
deliberation, which is dangerous because several jurors could come to
rely upon one juror’s notes, which may include irrelevant or stricken
material, or be lacking in significant detail; [(7)] a dishonest juror
could sway the verdict by falsifying notes; [(8)] jurors who take notes
may be listened to more carefully during deliberations simply because
they have what purports to be a summary of the testimony and if
inaccurate or selective, this can be dangerous; [(9)] notes, because
they are in writing, can fall into the wrong hands and make public a
juror’s most private thoughts; [and (10)] note taking can encourage
jurors to write books and such a juror might try to influence the
course of deliberations and the outcome of the case to make for a
better story to tell.
Dees, supra note 102, at 1773 (citing Supreme Court of Texas-Jury Reform
Task
Force,
Final
Report
(Sep.
8,
1997),
available
at
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/jurytaskforce/index.htm).
141. See Dees, supra note 102, at 1773-74; Dann, supra note 22, at 1251-52;
Jurors: Power of 12, supra note 134, at 83. The Arizona Supreme Court
Committee on More Effective Use of Juries noted that: “Experience has shown
that the obvious benefits of the practice . . . outweigh any supposed
drawbacks. . . . Jurors should be able to review their own notes during any
recess.” Id. The authors of the study discovered that the practice resulted in
increased attentiveness of the jurors at trial. Id. The practice also improved
juror memory recollection, reduced the frequency of and need for “court
reporter readbacks of testimony” during deliberations, and left jurors with
higher morale and increased satisfaction. Id. Additionally, in Arizona, where
juror note taking is commonplace, “[n]o material disadvantages have
surfaced.” Id. at 83-84.
142. Jurors: Power of 12, supra note 134, at 83-84; Dees, supra note 102, at
1774 (noting that the Supreme Court of Texas Jury Task Force concluded that
the prohibition on juror note taking was based on faulty assumptions).
143. See supra discussion at II.C.3 (explaining three ways juror passivity
can be reduced, including by allowing jurors to take notes during trial).
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2. Allowing Jurors to Question Witnesses
One way to improve the ability of jurors to comprehend the
evidence at trial would be to allow them to ask questions
during the course of the proceedings.144 This reform is perhaps
the most controversial and indeed, it involves a significant
departure from the current adversarial process towards “its
inquisitorial cousin.”145 Despite the drastic nature of this
reform, some jurisdictions have already put it into place.146
Indeed, the United States military has in place a system
whereby members:147
[M]ay request to call or recall witnesses, interrogate witnesses, take
notes during trial and use them in the deliberation room, request
during deliberations that the court-martial be reopened and portions
of the record be read to them or additional evidence introduced, and
take written instructions with them into the deliberation room.148

In the non-military federal context, such a reform would be
easily implemented, procedurally, since a plausible reading of
the Federal Rules of Evidence appears to allow individual
judges to permit the practice.149 In fact, several circuits have
“uniformly concluded that juror questioning is a permissible
practice, the allowance of which is within a judge’s
discretion.”150 Despite that uniformity, those same courts have
144. See Hans, supra note 104, at 90-91; Dann, supra note 22, at 1253-55;
Dees, supra note 102, at 1774-78.
145. See Hans, supra note 104, at 90.
146. Of states that have begun the process of jury reform, while Texas Jury
Task Force recommended that jurors not be allowed to ask questions, Arizona,
California, Colorado, and the District of Columbia all either endorse or are
considering allowing juror questioning in civil trials. Dees, supra note 102, at
1778. Additionally, the United States Military also allows such questioning.
See generally David A. Anderson, Let Jurors Talk: Authorizing PreDeliberation Discussion of the Evidence During Trial, 174 MIL. L. REV. 92
(2002).
147. Members are the military equivalent to jurors. Anderson, supra note
146, at 92.
148. Id. at 92-93.
149. FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (allowing the judge or magistrate to “exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of
time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment”).
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[t]here is nothing improper about
the practice of allowing occasional questions from jurors to be asked of
witnesses. If a juror is unclear as to a point in the proof, it makes good
common sense to allow a question to be asked about it.” United States v.
Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1979).
150. United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 14 (2d Cir.1995).
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clearly expressed their disapproval of the procedure.151
There are in essence three different approaches for
enabling juror questioning of witnesses. This Note advocates
adoption of either one of two.152 The first method, which is not
advocated by this Note, allows jurors to question witnesses
orally during the course of the trial.153 The second mode of
questioning would have jurors submit anonymous, written
questions to the court.154 After submission the “jury and
witness leave the courtroom”, and the judge rules on the
admissibility of the questions.155 The attorneys would also
have the opportunity to object.156 Assuming the questions are
admissible, the judge would ask the questions of the witness
and the attorneys would then be able to “ask follow-up
questions limited to the subject matter of the jurors’
questions.”157 Finally, the third method would have the jurors
submit written questions to the court only to be passed on to
the attorneys who could do with the question as they wish.158
Of course, the ability of the jurors to ask questions would
not be unlimited. Indeed, two limitations have already been
discussed. Namely that the questions must be in writing and
are then dealt with by the attorneys and judge outside of the
jury’s presence.
Additional safeguards could also be

151. Id. (noting that the general consensus is that jurors should only be
allowed to question witnesses in extraordinary circumstances). One argument
against the practice of juror questioning is that “[w]hen acting as inquisitors,
jurors can find themselves removed from their appropriate role as neutral
fact-finders.” Id. While the elimination of juror neutrality is a real concern,
one should not conflate participation in the fact-finding process with
partiality—a neutral juror need not be a passive one. See supra note 135 and
accompanying text.
152. See Dees, supra note 102, at 1774-75.
153. One serious problem that can arise when jurors are allowed to ask
questions orally, without being first filtered through the court is that counsel
will be unable to object to any of the questions asked “for fear of antagonizing,
alienating or embarrassing a juror.” United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d
719, 724 (3d Cir.1999). Given that alternative approaches exist, this Note
argues that oral questioning by jurors would not be the appropriate solution.
The serious consequences that can accompany oral questioning by jurors can
be mitigated, perhaps even eliminated, by use of written questions, filtered
through the attorneys and judge.
154. See Dees, supra note 102, at 1775.
155. Id. (quoting Judge Ken Curry & M. Beth Krugler, The Sound of
Silence: Are Silent Juries the Best Juries?, 62 Tex. B.J. 441, 442 (May 1999).
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting Curry & Krugler, supra note 155, at 442).
158. Id.
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implemented, such as a precautionary warning to the jurors
that they “not attach any significance to the failure of the judge
to ask a requested question since rules of law may prevent
some questions from being asked.”159
Since the major concern of those seeking to reform the way
in which patent cases are tried is the ability of the jury to
understand the evidence and subject matter before them,
allowing the jurors to ask questions should be a welcome
proposal. Although many legal practitioners are hostile to the
idea of allowing juror questioning, so long as jurors are not
allowed to engage in the practice, the effectiveness of all other
reforms is placed in jeopardy. The benefits that would accrue
by implementation of this reform outweigh the risks.160
Moreover, such a practice would take far fewer resources than
would the traditional reforms proposed for patent cases.161 The
jury developed because of its unique ability to discover the facts
of the case; the inability of jurors to actively participate in the
presentation of evidence obstructs the one task the jury was
designed to perform—discover truth.162
3. Pre-Deliberation Discussion of the Evidence: Losing the
Requirement that Jurors Not Discuss the Case Amongst
Themselves
One of the hallmarks of the traditional passive juror model
is the admonition to jurors forbidding them from discussing the
case or evidence amongst themselves until deliberations have
begun—after all the evidence has been submitted.163 The

159. Dann, supra note 22, at 1255. The State of Arizona’s Supreme Court
Committee on the More Effective Use of Juries proposed that jurors be:
[A]llowed to ask question during trials of civil and criminal cases,
subject to careful judicial supervision. At a minimum the safeguards
should include: telling the jurors in advance of trial of the procedures
to be followed; having questions put in writing and left unsigned;
discussing the question with the attorneys and allowing them to
object to the question out of the jury’s presence; the asking of the
question of the witness by the judge; and telling the jurors that the
law may prevent some of their questions from being asked.
Jurors: Power of 12, supra note 134, at 90.
160. Dann, supra note 22, at 1253.
161. See discussion and notes at section III.A (indeed, even the creation of
new specialty courts would require the expenditure of immense resources).
162. See discussion and notes at section II.A.
163. See Jurors: The Power of 12, supra note 134, at 96; Dann, supra note
22, at 1262; Dees, supra note 102, at 1782-84; Anderson, supra note 146, at 9495.
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controversy created by this reform proposal rivals allowing
juror questioning of witnesses. But if a goal of reforming the
trial process is accuracy in fact-finding, then this reform is
essential. The traditional rule is grounded in a view of the
average juror that is simply not based in reality.164 Jurors do
not passively absorb information and are not “accurate
encoder[s] of information [that] suspend[] judgment until the
end of the case.”165 Recognizing this, the Arizona Supreme
Court Committee on the More Effective Use of Juries proposed
that jurors “be instructed that they are permitted to discuss the
evidence among themselves in the jury room during recesses
from trial, when all are present, as long as they reserve
judgment about the outcome of the case until deliberations
It is a sensible reform with profound
commence.”166
consequences.
The benefits of such a reform in the patent litigation
context are manifest. Allowing jurors to discuss evidence
during the course of the trial will enhance “juror understanding
of the evidence”, and questions that might be forgotten by the
time deliberations begin can be asked immediately.167 The
primary criticisms of this proposal are not without merit,
however. There is a legitimate concern that allowing jurors to
discuss the case during the trial without having heard all of the
evidence “(1) would cause jurors to make premature
determinations about a case; (2) would jeopardize the jury’s
impartiality; [and] (3) would cause extra-legal factors to cloud
decision-making.”168 Fortunately, the fears of the critics have
not materialized in those jurisdictions that have begun to allow
the practice. Thus far, studies have shown “no overall effects of
trial discussions” on the timing of when jurors begin to make
164. See Dann, supra note 22, at 1263.
165. Id.
166. Jurors: The Power of 12, supra note 134, at 98.
167. Dann, supra note 22, at 1264; see also Dees, supra note 102, at 1782
(noting that not only can pre-deliberation discussion “lead to enhanced
understanding of the case,” but it “can lead to more thoughtful consideration
of the case; . . . reduce juror stress; and . . . result in greater efficiency”).
168. Dees, supra note 102, at 1782. Anderson notes similar criticism but
adds that another fear is that not only will jurors form opinions earlier on, but
that subsequent to forming an opinion, jurors will “pay greater attention to
evidence that confirms” their initial opinion. Anderson supra note 146, at 95
(citing Commonwealth v. Kerpan, 498 A.2d 829, 831 (Pa. 1985)). In addition,
“[t]he quality of deliberations may decline as jurors become more familiar with
each other’s views.” Id. at 95 (citing JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 139 (G. Thomas
Munsterman et al. eds., 1997)).
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up their minds.169 Indeed, rather than make jurors more alike
in terms of how they believe the case should turn out, allowing
pre-deliberation discussions had the tendency to “encourage[]
more vigorous debate.”170 Additionally, the vast majority of
judges who have “had actual experience with civil jury trials in
which pre-deliberation discussions were permitted”, reported
that the practice was a “positive development”171 and that predeliberation discussions should be permitted in civil cases.172
While countless other reform proposals exist that would
have the potential to improve the ability of jurors to recall,
analyze, and understand the information presented to them at
trial, the three proposed—permitting juror note taking,
allowing juror questioning of witnesses, and enabling jurors to
discuss the evidence amongst themselves during the course of
the trial—would do the most in the way of improving the ability
of the jurors to perform their task.
IV. CONCLUSION
If it had been as easy to remove the jury from the customs as from
the laws of England, it would have perished under the Tudors; and the
civil jury did in reality at that period save the liberties of England. . . .
[T]he civil jury[] serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the
minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the habits which attend
it, is the soundest preparation for free institutions. It imbues all
classes with a respect for the thing judged and with the notion of
right. If these two elements be removed, the love of independence
becomes a mere destructive passion. . . .
....
. . . I do not know whether the jury is useful to those who have
lawsuits, but I am certain it is highly beneficial to those who judge
them . . . .173

169. Hans, supra note 104, at 95-96. Additionally, Hans reports that
“[j]udicial agreement with the jury verdicts was similar in trials where juries
had or had not been permitted to participate in trial discussions.” Id.
170. Id. at 96. Additionally, juries that could engage in discussions about
the case during the trial “reported more conflict and more difficulty reaching”
a unanimous verdict than those juries that could not engage in such
discussions. Id.
171. Anderson, supra note 146, at 112-13 (quoting Natasha K. Lakamp,
Deliberating Juror Predeliberation Discussions: Should California Follow the
Arizona Model?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 845, 871 (1998)).
172. Lakamp, supra note 171, at 871. In the study cited, 92.1% of the
judges who responded to the survey (43.3%) favored allowing predeliberation
discussions. Id.
173. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284-85 (Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. 1994) (1835).
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As an institution, the jury has weathered the storms of
time and withstood the salvos which nearly all political
institutions face. The petit jury developed in the 12th and 13th
Centuries as a method of discovering truth.174 Since that time
the methodologies employed by the jury have undergone
dramatic change, as have the purposes for which the jury is
used. Yet, in America the jury has been elevated to a status
not reached anywhere else on the globe. In the United States,
the jury has two fundamental natures that any reforms must
take into account—the judicial and the political.175 From the
time of the Navigation and Stamp Acts, the jury has taken on a
political significance in this nation that it has not achieved
elsewhere. That is why, even in the patent litigation context, it
is so difficult to reform the system without maintaining the role
of the jury. The institution is an omnipresent characteristic of
our system, and thus far, the solutions that have garnered the
most attention have been designed to improve upon, rather
than eliminate the civil jury.
While blue ribbon panels and specialty courts have merits
that have not gone unnoticed in this Note, it is this author’s
belief that those reforms are inadequate. While such reforms
alone would no doubt improve the quality of the jury’s factfinding, problems would remain that undermine the ability of
any jury to perform its job.176 The passive juror model must be
relegated to the dustbin of history. Not only does it ignore
human nature, but it threatens to undermine the integrity of
the judicial process. The law is, after all, administered by
human beings. While those involved in the process may try
their hardest, they can, and at times, do arrive at wrong
conclusions. The purpose of this Note is to examine how the
active juror model can be used to reform the patent litigation
system. As Mark Twain noted, jurors are often criticized for
their ignorance. The question to ask, then, is whether it is the
jurors themselves or the procedures governing them that cause
those in academia and in practice to view the jury so
negatively.

174. See infra section II.A.
175. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 173, at 280.
176. See infra section III.A.

